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Abstract 
In this paper, I review accounts of the moral status of infants and fetuses to show that they either fail 
to establish that infants are properly rights-bearers or fail to explain the grounds of this status. I then 
develop an account of teleological potential understood with reference to Phillipa Foot’s Natural 
Norms and argue that it can ground the rights-bearing status of infants and fetuses while avoiding 
the typical objections to potentiality-based accounts. I then incorporate this into a two-fold account 
of moral status directed at concerns of justice and charity, and grounded in sophisticated cognitive 
capacities and sentience respectively, which allows one to maintain that fetuses possess 
rights-bearing status alongside the intuition that infants are due more moral consideration. Finally, I 
consider potential objections based on concerns about women’s autonomy and implications about 
the severely cognitively disabled.  
 
Although abortion remains highly contested in political spheres, recent 
philosophical literature tends to support a permissive view, reflecting the 
dominance of accounts that ground rights-bearing in sophisticated cognitive 
capacities.1 Lacking such capacities, the typical argument goes, the fetus lacks 
the normative personhood and attendant rights that form the basis of a strong 
embargo against killing it. The requirement of sophisticated cognitive capacities, 
however, also excludes infants from normative personhood. 2  Those who 
maintain that infants are properly rights-bearers, therefore, have reason to think 
such accounts incomplete. To my mind, the most straightforward response to 
infants’ lack of sophisticated cognitive capacities is to appeal to their potential to 
develop such capacities, which suggests that fetuses are similarly entitled to 
moral consideration. However, even if one is sympathetic, as I am, to fetal rights, 
it undeniably seems worse to harm an infant than to harm a very early fetus or a 
                                                     
* Graduate Student, University of Oxford. Email: sara.chan[a]philosophy.ox.ac.uk 
** I am grateful to Thomas Sinclair for detailed comments and guidance on an early draft of this paper, 
to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments, and to the participants of the First International 
Conference on Philosophy and Meaning in Life (2018) at Hokkaido University, Sapporo, where a 
version of this paper was presented. 
1 Jaworska & Tannenbaum (2018). 
2 E.g. See Giubilini & Minerva (2012). 
 65
zygote. This essay aims to ground the rights-bearing status of both infants and 
fetuses while respecting this intuition. Towards this end, Section I motivates this 
project by reviewing existing accounts and showing how they fail either to 
establish infants’ intrinsic rights-bearing status or to satisfactorily ground their 
possession of such status. Section II then develops an account of teleological 
potential as the grounds for rights-bearing status and Section III integrates this 
account into a two-fold account of moral status based on justice and charity and 
shows how this can explain why infants morally matter more than fetuses. 
Finally, Section IV considers some possible objections. 
 
I: Existing Accounts 
 
This section examines the pro-abortion and anti-abortion literature in search 
of an account that both ascribes rights-bearing status to infants and successfully 
explains the grounds for it. I will begin by clarifying some key terms. First, 
moral status refers how much an entity or its interests morally matter for the 
entity’s own sake, and may be distinguished from moral standing, understood as 
whether an entity matters morally.3 Next, full moral status indicates that one is 
due the highest moral consideration and is sometimes described in terms of 
personhood, where to be a person in a normative sense is to possess full moral 
status. One feature of full moral status is that it entails pre-emptive moral 
consideration, or the possession of moral rights. I will refer to this specifically as 
rights-bearing status. 
Perhaps the most influential view is that rights-bearing status is grounded in 
the possession of certain sophisticated cognitive capacities, such as autonomy,4 
self-awareness,5 or the ability to conceive of oneself as a continuous subject of 
mental states.6 Precisely which capacity is unimportant for the purposes of this 
paper. What is important is that both infants and fetuses lack these sophisticated 
cognitive capacities. Some theorists, notably Tooley and Singer, bite the bullet 
and accept that infants therefore are not normative persons.7 Although other 
prudential reasons to treat infants as if they are rights-bearers may mitigate the 
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practical consequences of this, the notion that infants are not intrinsically 
rights-bearers is still repugnant to commonsense morality. 
One account that seeks to explain the moral consideration intrinsically due 
to infants is Jeff McMahan’s Time-Relative Interests Account (TRIA). 
Ultimately, McMahan endorses some form of the sophisticated cognitive 
capacities account.8 In addition, however, he introduces the TRIA to explain the 
moral concern due to entities who lack such capacities. According to the TRIA, 
how much an entity or its interests matters morally depends not only on the 
strength of those interests, but also on the strength of the psychological 
connections, such as memory and hope for the future, between the individual 
presently and the individual when those interests will be realized.9 This allows 
McMahan to explain why it is worse to kill infants than to kill animals: in virtue 
of their potential for sophisticated capacities, infants have extremely valuable 
futures, even discounted by their weak psychological connections to those 
futures.10 Next, the TRIA can also explain why infants are due more moral 
concern than fetuses: once infants are born they are exposed to much stimuli, 
leading their cognitive capacities develop very quickly thus enabling them to 
have greater psychological connections to their later interests, and entitling them 
to more moral concern. 11  Ultimately, however, although infants’ valuable 
futures and rapidly increasing psychological connections to these futures entitle 
them to some intrinsic moral status, it still does not ground rights-bearing. 
Next, moving away from the sophisticated cognitive capacities account, 
another influential account is Joel Feinberg’s interest view which grounds 
rights-bearing status in the capacity for interests.12 Despite focusing on interests, 
however, Feinberg still requires certain sophisticated cognitive capacities for 
rights-bearing status, because he holds that the capacity for conscious 
self-awareness is prerequisite for desires, which in turn is necessary for having 
interests.13  Ultimately, therefore, Feinberg’s view implies that infants lack 
intrinsic rights-bearing status, although he does mitigate this by arguing 
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infanticide is wrong because of other reasons such as the common good.14 
Notably, not all who count themselves interest theorists align themselves 
with Feinberg on what is required to have interests. Bonnie Steinbock, for 
example, maintains that interests require simply the capacity for consciousness 
or sentience, which allows her to claim infants have interests.15 Crucially, 
however, Steinbock takes interests to ground moral standing rather than 
rights-bearing.16 In other words, although infants possess the capacity for 
interests on Steinbock’s account, this is insufficient to ground rights-bearing 
status. 
Thus far, I have discussed several accounts of rights-bearing which support 
a permissive view of abortion and found that none ascribe intrinsic 
rights-bearing status to infants. This is, perhaps, unsurprising since infants do 
not differ significantly from late fetuses in terms of intrinsic cognitive qualities. 
I will next examine whether the anti-abortion literature may provide a plausible 
account of the rights-bearing of infants and fetuses. 
One traditional way to ground the rights-bearing status of infants and fetuses 
is in their membership of the human species. Early versions of this view, for 
example, as posited by Stanley Benn, posit being human as both necessary and 
sufficient for rights-bearing. 17  Since this precludes other rational species, 
however, more recent accounts, such as John Finnis’s, often accept sophisticated 
cognitive capacities as the primary grounds for rights-bearing status and posit 
species membership as a secondary sufficient but not necessary condition. 18 
That is, one possesses rights-bearing status either if one possesses sophisticated 
cognitive capacities or if one is a member of a species which characteristically 
possesses such capacities. Such accounts, however, are vulnerable to the charge 
that they ground the substantial moral fact of rights-bearing in a seemingly 
morally irrelevant biological fact: It is unclear why species membership should 
be morally relevant for members who lack the morally relevant attributes,19 and 
to hold that it does, Peter Singer claims, is “speciesism” and morally equivalent 
to racism or sexism.20  The Species Membership account is unsatisfactory 
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because although it ascribes rights-bearing status to infants, it fails to explain 
why species membership should ground such status. 
Next, other influential accounts within the anti-abortion literature include 
the Sanctity of Life Account, the Special Relations Account and the Future Like 
Ours Account. Upon closer examination, however, these accounts turn out to be 
tangential to rights-bearing: according to Ronald Dworkin’s Sanctity of Life 
account, opposition to abortion derives from belief in the intrinsic, sacred and 
non-incremental value of human life.21 Since this value is non-incremental, it is 
not better for there to be more human lives, but since it is intrinsically valuable, 
there is objective reason to protect human life where it does exist. Notice, 
however, that the moral reasons thus generated are impersonal duties: abortion is 
immoral because it disrespects life, rather than because the fetus itself is worthy 
of special moral consideration.22 The sanctity of life account is silent on the 
issue of rights-bearing status. 
Next, the Special Relations Account is built on the fact that certain 
relationships, such as the parent-child relationship, generate particular duties, 
such as parents’ duty to care for their children. Robert Nozick suggests that the 
relationship of shared species membership may generate duties to treat members 
of same species with respect in a similar manner.23 Crucially, however, the 
parent-child relationship grounds the special duties of parents towards their 
children but does not change the child’s intrinsic moral status: unrelated 
individuals have no special duties to the child. Although the Special 
Relationship account may generate duties for people to treat infants with 
particular moral consideration, it does not ground intrinsic rights-bearing status.  
Finally, Don Marquis’s Future Like Ours Account (FLOA) holds that 
abortion is immoral for the same reason that killing an adult person is immoral, 
namely because it deprives the victim of a valuable future.24 The problem, 
however, is that it does not seem that what is primarily wrong about killing an 
adult person is that it deprives him of a valuable future. It is equally wrong to 
kill a 90-year-old as it is to kill an 18-year-old, despite the 18-year-old losing 
more years of good life. Death may be worse for the 18-year-old than for the 
90-year-old, but it is equally wrong to kill them both because doing so violates 
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their right to life. Thus, although the FLOA may explain why death is bad for 
fetuses and infants, and so in a sense why it would be wrong to kill them, it does 
not address rights-bearing. 
I have now reviewed accounts of rights-bearing status on both sides of the 
abortion debate and found that they either fail to establish that infants are 
properly rights-bearers or fail to explain the grounds of this status, thus 
establishing the need for such an account. 
 
II: Natural Norms and Teleological Potential 
 
To my mind, the argument from potential, which posits that the potential to 
develop sophisticated cognitive capacities grounds rights-bearing status, is the 
most promising starting point, firstly because it is an intuitive response to 
infants’ lack of sophisticated cognitive capacities and secondly because it 
grounds rights-bearing status in an intrinsic property. This section will attempt 
to develop a plausible version of the argument from potential. 
Despite its promise, the argument from potential is infamous for two 
problems: first, the potential for X does not normally confer the rights of X.25 
For example, before 2016, Donald Trump’s potential to become president did 
not give him presidential rights until he actually realized that potential. Second, 
the argument from potential is vulnerable to the following reductio ad 
absurdum: an egg and sperm technically have the potential for sophisticated 
cognitive capacities, but most would deny that they are rights-bearers.26 
These objections are valid but need not be definitive. It is not categorically 
true that potential can never ground rights: the right to health insurance, for 
example, is grounded in the potential to fall ill rather than the actuality of being 
ill.27 Potentiality accounts may still succeed by explaining why potential should 
matter in this case.28 Meanwhile, the second problem can be answered if the 
reductio can be resisted. Whether and how an account from potential may meet 
these objections depends on how the notion of potential is cached out. 
What does it mean to have potential? One option is that X has the potential 
to become Y if X will eventually become Y. This, however, is easily subject to 
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counter-example: suppose an infant had a genetic cardiac disease that would kill 
him before he was 3 years-old, it seems strange to suppose that he would 
therefore not be a rights-bearer whereas other infants without that disease would 
be. Alternatively, one might determine potential with respect to possibility rather 
than actuality. That is, X has the potential to become Y if X might possibly 
become Y. This however is similarly vulnerable to counter-example. Extensive 
gene therapy could render it possible for dogs to develop sophisticated cognitive 
capacities, which would imply that normal dogs possess rights-bearing status, 
which is counterintuitive.29 
These examples show that determining potential with respect to actuality or 
possibility results in a quagmire of unpalatable scenarios. The crucial thing, as 
James Griffin remarks, seems to be that “the moral significance of potentiality 
[…] depend[s] upon not only what it is potential for, but also what it is the 
potential of (italics mine)”.30 A viable account of rights-supporting potential 
must discriminate between different kinds of entities. I submit that a normative 
or teleological account of potential can do so. 
Something is normative if it derives from a standard or a norm, and 
something is teleological if it involves explanation in terms of purpose. Massimo 
Reichlin has suggested that an Aristotelian (i.e. teleological) notion of 
potentiality that conceives of a fetus as “already possessing the human nature 
(understood as a principle of becoming, rather than a static thing) and actively 
developing its potential for personhood”, 31  can ground fetal rights. 
Contemporary readers, however, may be somewhat wary of Aristotelian 
teleology.32 Where does the telos come from, they wonder? Who sets the 
norms? This essay aims to answer these questions with appeal to Phillipa Foot’s 
notion of natural norms. 
According to Foot, living things have the capacity for “natural goodness”, 
that is, they have goods (and bads) independent of the plans or desires of other 
things.33 For example, it is good for a plant to grow well, and it is bad for it to 
be diseased. This kind of goodness stands in contrast with good predicated of 
things because it benefits something else, for example, when it is good that an 
ox plough a field because the farmer desires that the ox plough the field. Natural 
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goodness is determined with respect to what is characteristically good for a 
species insofar as it furthers individual survival and propagation of the species.34 
A good x is an x that is ordinarily well-suited as an x to do or live well, to thrive 
or flourish in a characteristically x way.35 
An obvious obstacle to extending this view to people is that most now reject 
the notion of a nature-determined good for individual persons.36 A man can 
swear celibacy and there is value in that choice because he freely chooses it even 
if it is against the end of species propagation.  This intrinsic value of autonomy 
arises because people are possessed of rational capacity, and it is to this that 
Foot appeals in extending natural goodness to people.37 We can understand the 
characteristic way of being and flourishing for persons as the rational way.38 A 
thriving human being is one that autonomously chooses his own destiny, and the 
value of his doing so is properly counted natural goodness. This dovetails nicely 
with the idea that it is sophisticated cognitive capacities that makes persons 
special. 
Foot’s next key premise is that the meaning of good in “a good plant is not 
diseased” is not significantly different compared to in “a morally good man 
keeps his promises”.39 Moral goodness does not occupy a sphere distinct from 
natural goodness. This may surprise contemporary readers whose intuitions have 
been honed by John Stuart Mill to regard the moral sphere as special and 
generally other-regarding. Foot, however, argues that moral goodness fits within 
the wider class of evaluations of natural goodness and shares the same structure 
of normative evaluation: just as natural goodness is determined with respect to 
the characteristic good of a species, moral virtues are evaluated in relation to 
how they contribute to characteristic human flourishing, which is in turn 
determined with respect to natural norms. 40 For example, just as it is good to 
stay in bed when one is sick, because that furthers the pursuit of health which is 
part of human flourishing, it is on Foot’s schema, morally good to keep a 
promise because that furthers an aspect of human flourishing. Notice that this 
works only because virtue is part of human flourishing, and virtue is only part of 
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human flourishing because human beings are firstly social beings whose good is 
furthered in living in community with each other, and secondly rational beings 
who can understand morality. Moral goodness is a special subset of natural 
goodness which generates particularly important considerations and is 
applicable to beings whose rationality enables them to understand morality. 
If we accept moral goodness as a subset of natural goodness, natural 
goodness can function to explain the notion, key to moral status, of “mattering 
for one’s own sake”. The capacity for natural goodness is necessary and 
sufficient for mattering for one’s own sake, which I shall call the possession of 
normative status. Since moral value is a subset of natural value, however, 
normative status is necessary but not sufficient for moral status. A plant has 
natural goodness but does not matter morally. Something further, such as the 
sentience, is required. 
Next, natural norms provide a reference for understanding teleological 
potential. Recall that the characteristic way of man’s flourishing is via his 
rationality. This is his telos, it is the natural way in which his life is good. As 
members of the human species, infants and zygotes potentially have this 
characteristic way of flourishing, and it is good for their sake that they achieve it. 
They have the teleological potential for sophisticated cognitive capacities. In 
contrast, it is not in the nature of a dog in virtue of its dog-hood that it is 
characteristically rational, regardless of what possibilities gene therapy opens 
up. 
Notice that in basing teleology on species norms, we are implicitly 
committed to a metaphysical view of persons in which physicality is essential. 
For example, that we are essentially physical beings with emergent mental 
properties. A metaphysical view in which we are, for example, embodied minds, 
would be in tension with the important role species plays in this account. 
Next, since natural norms are determined with respect to species, one might 
worry that this is a disguised kind of speciesism. Although the account from 
teleological potential does have the same implications as the Species Norm 
account however, it differs crucially in that it explains why species is a morally 
relevant fact. By situating moral goodness within the wider concept of natural 
goodness which is determined with respect to species norms, the relevance of 
species to morality is made clear: natural goodness, which includes moral 
goodness, depends on what kind of thing something is, and what kind of thing 
something is depends on species. On this account, species is not morally 
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irrelevant. 
Having explained how teleological potential can be understood with 
reference to natural norms, I will now show how teleological potential thus 
understood can address the problems for potentiality accounts set out at the 
beginning of this section. 
The first problem was how to explain why potential should matter. Bertha 
Alvarez Manninen suggests that for potential to ground a right, potential must 
generate an interest in a moral right such that possessing the moral right 
constitutes a benefit for the potential entity and a denial of the moral right 
constitutes a harm.41 What makes this criterion plausible is that it restricts the 
scope to moral rights. Rights, such as access to healthcare, are fundamentally 
crucial to one’s well-being in a way benefits such as presidential powers are not, 
which allows explanation of why one can be grounded by potential and the other 
not. The account from teleological potential can meet Manninen’s criterion. It is 
inbuilt into the concept of teleological potential that it is good for the entity to 
realise its potential because that potential is its essential nature and not to realise 
it is accordingly a positive harm, rather than merely a lack of a good. Finally, 
although rights-bearing status is not itself a right, it is at least as important to 
well-being as a right since the possession of any right is contingent on the 
possession of rights-bearing status. Therefore, on the plausible assumption that it 
is because rights are fundamentally crucial to welfare that they can be grounded 
in potential, it seems that rights-bearing status, being similarly fundamental to 
well-being, may also be grounded in potential. 
Next, the second problem was how to resist the reductio ad absurdum that 
the potential of the sperm and the egg to develop into normative persons implies 
that they have rights-bearing status. From a teleological perspective, the sperm 
has the purpose of fertilizing the egg, and there is goodness when it does so. 
Crucially however, from a teleological perspective, the sperm is but a part of the 
man, and although it may be “good” for the sperm to fertilize the egg, the 
goodness is proper to the man, rather than to the sperm. Something cannot be 
good “for the sperm’s own sake”, because the sperm does not have a sake of its 
own. The sperm does not possess the normative status that is a precondition for 
moral status. A similar argument may be made with respect to the egg. As for the 
gametes considered jointly, although they together possess all the genetic 
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material for a full human organism, before combination they are still not one 
organism, and so should not be considered as one entity for which the question 
of moral status arises. In contrast, the zygote is not a part of either father or 
mother, but a new entity individualized by its own genetic code. Its goodness 
therefore cannot be determined with respect to either father or mother, but only 
properly with respect to itself. The zygote therefore possesses normative status, 
and being a complete human organism, the teleological potential for normative 
personhood that grounds rights-bearing status.42 Since this account does not 
depend on the zygote being numerically identical to the person it will later 
become, it is unaffected by the possibility of splitting. Splitting refers to when 
the zygote, or the few totipotent cells that it divides into, gives rise to not one 
but two individuals, that is, twins. The possibility of splitting is a problem for 
accounts that base the harm of killing the fetus on the fetus’s numerical identity 
with a later person, because if splitting occurs, the zygote is not identical to a 
later person, and cannot be identical to two people.43 In contrast, the account 
from teleological potential can accommodate the possibility of splitting, because 
the zygote possesses the teleological potential for sophisticated cognitive 
capacities regardless of whether this potential is eventually actualized in one or 
more individuals. 
Some may protest that to extend rights-bearing status to the zygote is itself 
absurd. I suspect, however, that those who would make such an objection would 
also object to extending rights-bearing status to fetuses, and so would be not be 
attracted to this account anyway. Meanwhile, the majority of those committed to 
fetal rights already extend rights-bearing status to the zygote. 
In sum, this section developed an account of teleological potential based on 
natural norms. In doing so, I hope to have presented a plausible account of the 
grounds of the rights-bearing status of infants as well as fetuses. 
 
III: Justice and Charity 
 
Even ardent supporters of fetal rights, however, would be hard pressed to 
deny that infants are due more moral consideration than early fetuses or zygotes: 
if one has the opportunity to save only one of either an infant or a zygote in a 
petri-dish from a burning building, most would agree that one should save the 
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infant. This section will incorporate the account from teleological potential 
within a two-fold approach to moral status based on justice and charity to 
accommodate this intuition. 
The distinction between justice and charity is hardly novel. Justice and 
charity may pull in different directions. For example, to remunerate each worker 
according to how much he has worked is just, but to give more to he who needs 
more may be considered charitable. And since moral concerns may be directed 
at either justice or charity, it seems natural that moral status, may be directed at 
either justice or charity as well. Indeed, although the justice-based notion of 
rights-endowing moral status predominates in discussions of the moral status of 
persons, discussions of the moral status of animals often references charity.44 
I suggest that persons possess two kinds of moral status, directed at justice 
and charity respectively. Justice-oriented moral status is equivalent to 
rights-bearing status, and is grounded in sophisticated cognitive capacities, or 
the teleological potential for such capacities. Meanwhile, charity-oriented moral 
status is the moral consideration an entity is entitled to as a proper object of 
charitable feeling. Suppose someone was uncomfortably warm. Although he has 
no right, that is, no claim of justice that his discomfort be alleviated, it would be 
morally good to do so. The moral concern relevant here is not justice, but charity, 
and it is relevant because of the subject is sentient. There is no charity in fanning 
a hot rock. Charity-oriented moral status, therefore, is grounded in sentience 
because it is the feeling pain or pleasure which is the basis of an action’s being 
cruel or kind. And just as animals with greater sentience increase in moral status, 
a human organism, as it increases in sentience may increase in charity-oriented 
moral status. 
Notice how this differs from rights-bearing status. Whereas rights-bearing 
status is a threshold concept so someone with better cognitive faculties is not 
due more rights-bearing status, charity-oriented moral status admits of degrees. 
Accordingly, although I have argued that teleological potential may ground 
justice-oriented moral status, I doubt much can be made of a similar argument 
for charity-oriented moral status. We can understand full moral status, then, as 
possessing both rights-bearing status and the highest degree of charity-oriented 
moral status. 
To return to the titular concern of this paper, infants, fetuses and even 
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zygotes possess rights-bearing status in virtue of their teleological potential. 
Only infants and post-sentient fetuses, however, possess charity-oriented moral 
status, and fetuses increase in charity-oriented moral status as their sense 
capacities develop, thus explaining why infants matter more than zygotes, and 
why fetuses are thought to matter more the more developed they are. Thus, I 
hope to have shown that the intuition that infants are due more moral 
consideration than zygotes can be accommodated alongside acceptance of the 





Thus far, I have argued that there is currently a lack of an account grounding 
the rights-bearing status of infants, developed an account of teleological 
potential to answer this lack and integrated it into a two-fold approach to moral 
status. This final section will consider two potential objections to this account. 
The first potential objection derives from the issue of woman’s rights and is 
directed against the fact that this account affirms fetal rights. In the words of 
Mary Anne Warren, “so long as the fetus remains within the woman’s body, it is 
impossible to treat it as if it were already a person with full and equal moral 
rights, without at the same time treating the woman as if she were something 
less”. 45  The idea is that granting fetuses rights would be a form of 
discrimination threatening the bodily autonomy of women, hence fetuses cannot 
be granted rights and any account that does so is sexist and misguided.46 
Notice, however, that the mere fact that fetal rights may conflict with 
women’s rights is no reason to suppose either that to grant fetal rights is to 
undermine women’s autonomy, or to suppose that they cannot co-exist. 
Commonly accepted rights have the potential to conflict, but this is not normally 
taken to be a valid reason for denying that those rights exist. A’s right to freedom 
of movement may conflict with B’s property rights when A exercises her 
freedom by breaking into B’s house, but that is no reason to deny A’s right to 
freedom, only to judge that B’s property rights should take precedence. Similarly, 
merely accepting fetal rights does not automatically override the rights of the 
mother. The fetus’s moral status is but one factor informing the permissibility of 
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abortion. Judith Jarvis Thomson, for example, argues for the permissibility of 
abortion even assuming the fetus has full moral status.47 How the strength of the 
mother’s right to bodily autonomy weighs against the fetus’s right to life is both 
important and interesting, but falls beyond the scope of this paper. 
 Next, and more importantly for this paper, legal rights are distinct from 
intrinsic rights and rights-bearing status, although ideally the latter should 
inform the former. It seems that on a scale of moral fundamentality, the intrinsic 
moral status of the fetus is metaphysically prior to the permissibility of abortion 
which is prior to the laws of society, and so ideally, legal rights concerning 
abortion should be based on the ethics of abortion which in turn should be built 
upon how the moral status of the fetus weighs against the rights of the mother. 
To reason in reverse from the not uncontroversial positions that fetuses cannot 
be granted legal rights or that abortion must be permissible to the conclusion 
that the fetus therefore cannot intrinsically be a rights-bearer seems a dubious 
argumentative move, especially since it is possible to maintain that the fetus has 
rights-bearing status alongside a permissive view of abortion. 
Next, a second objection to the account may be made based on its 
implications about the severely cognitively disabled. Although the account of 
teleological potential can maintain that the severely cognitively disabled have 
the teleological potential for sophisticated cognitive capacities in virtue of their 
humanity, and hence do possess rights-bearing status, it also seems committed to 
implying that the severely cognitively disabled are defective since they lack the 
characteristic rational way for human beings to flourish.  
Perhaps, however, there may be room to resist the idea that the severely 
cognitively disabled are defective human beings while maintaining that for an 
adult human being to lack rationality is a defect. That is, one might allow that 
severe cognitive disability is a defect in the abstract but deny that this 
defectiveness is carried over to the individuals who possess it. As an analogy, 
consider the Japanese art of kintsugi, or “golden joinery”, which involves 
repairing broken pottery with gold-dusted lacquer. Although the breaks are 
objectively flaws, in the finished product they are instead what makes the pot 
unique and beautiful. Moreover, the finished pot is not flawed. Similarly, we 
might allow that severe cognitive disabilities in the abstract are defects, but 
maintain that when instantiated in severely cognitively disabled people, they are 
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part of what makes them who they are, and moreover, such people are not 
defective. 
In order for the kintsugi analogy to work with respect to the severely 
cognitively disabled, however, a coherent story must be told about how the 
cognitively disabled flourish in a normatively human way that is not the typical 
rational way. It is not impossible that such a story could be told: for example, 
citing disability-positive testimony and the wide range of ways in which humans 
can pursue interesting and meaningful lives, Elizabeth Barnes has recently 
argued that physical disability is merely a different rather than a defective way 
of being; although deaf people lack the intrinsic good of hearing, there are also 
other goods in which they participate by virtue of their deafness, such as the 
experience of music through vibrations.48 On this view, deafness is a way of 
experiencing life that cannot be summed up simply by the lack of hearing. If 
such a view can be extended to cognitive disability, the kintsugi analogy might 
be applicable. 
Unfortunately, however, conceiving of severe cognitive disability as merely 
a different way of being seems rather in tension with the account from 
teleological potential. Whereas in the kintsugi example where the repaired 
breaks do not fundamentally undermine the main purpose of the bowl or the cup, 
whether this purpose is functional or purely aesthetic, the lack of rationality in 
an adult human being, on an account that holds that the telos of human beings is 
the rational way, does undermine the main telos. It seems impossible for a way 
that is not rational to achieve the telos, and so impossible for another way of 
flourishing to be as good as the rational way. Conversely, if one instead holds 
that the rational way is but one of the ways of human flourishing, rationality 
loses its special status as the human telos, which the account from teleological 
potential needs to maintain. Ultimately, therefore, the implication that the 
severely cognitively disabled fail to achieve the human telos seems to be a bullet 
the proponent of the account from teleological potential will have to bite. 
Crucially, however, the practical implications of this are muted since even if 
they do not actualize this potential, the severely cognitively disabled do still 
have the teleological potential for sophisticated cognitive capacities that grounds 
rights-bearing status. 
 
                                                     




In conclusion, this paper has developed an account of the moral status of 
infants and fetuses, arguing firstly that teleological potential for sophisticated 
cognitive capacities understood with reference to natural norms can ground their 
rights-bearing status, and secondly that moral status should be understood as 
two-fold and directed at either justice and charity, with infants typically having 
more charity-oriented moral status than fetuses. There may, however, be 
objections to this account deriving from women’s bodily autonomy and the case 
of the severely cognitively disabled, and although I have suggested that 
women’s autonomy need not be incompatible with fetal rights, I am not sure that 





Barnes, Elizabeth, The Minority Mind: A theory of Disability, Oxford University 
Press. (2016). 
Benn, Stanley, “Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests,” in Nomos 
IX: Equality, Pennock, J. R. and Chapman, J. (eds.), New York: Atherton Press, 
pp. 61–78. (1967). 
Boonin, David, A Defence of Abortion, New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. (2003). 
Buchanan, Allen, “Moral Status and Human Enhancement,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 37; 4, pp.346–381. (2009). 
Copelon, Zampas, Bruise & deVore, “Human Rights Begin at Birth: 
International Law and the Claim of Fetal Rights,” in Reproductive Health 
Matters, 13;26, pp.120-12. (2005). 
DeGrazia, David, “The Harm of Death, Time-Relative Interests, and Abortion”, 
Philosophical Forum, 38;1, pp.57-80. (2007). 
Dworkin, Ronald, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and 
Euthanasia, Harper Collins Publishers. (1993). 
Feinberg, Joel & Levenbook, Barara Baum, “Abortion,” in Matters of Life and 
Death: New Introdutory Essays in Moral Philosophy, 3rd edition, Regan, Tom 
(ed.), McGraw-Hill, Inc. pp.195-235. (1993). 
Finnis, John, “A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia,” in Euthanasia 
Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives. Keown, John (ed.), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1995). 
Foot, Phillipa. Natural Goodness. Oxford University Press. (2011). 
Giubilini, Alberto & Minerva, Francesca, “After-birth Abortion: Why Should the 
Baby Live?,” in Journal of Medical Ethics, 39, pp.261-263. (2013). 
Griffin, James, On Human Rights, Oxford University Press. (2008). 
Harman, Elizabeth. “The Potentiality Problem,” in Philosophical Studies: An 
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 114;1/2. 
Selected Papers from the 2002 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference at 
Western Washington University, pp. 173-198. (2003). 
Hursthouse, Rosalind. Beginning Lives, Oxford: Basil Blackwell in association 
with the Open University. (1987). 
Jaworska, Agnieszka and Tannenbaum, Julie, “The Grounds of Moral Status,” 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Zalta, Edward, (ed.). (2018). 
 81
Manninen, Bertha Alvarez. “Revisiting the Argument from Fetal Potential,” in 
Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in Medicine, 2;7. (2007). 
Marquis, Don, “Why Abortion is Immoral,” in The Journal of Philosophy, 86;4, 
pp.183-202. (1989). 
McMahan, Jeff, ‘Early Death and Later Suffering,’ (forthcoming). 
McMahan, Jeff, The Ethics of Killing, Oxford University Press. (2002). 
Morris, Christopher. ‘The Idea of Moral Standing,’ in The Oxford Handbook of 
Animal Ethics, Beauchamp, Tom and Frey, R.G. (eds.), Oxford University Press, 
pp.256-275. (2011). 
Nozick, Robert, “Do Animals Have Rights? A Review of Regan, Tom, The Case 
for Animal Rights (1983),” in Nozick’s Socratic Puzzles, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, pp. 305–310. (1997). 
Quinn, W., “Abortion: Identity and Loss,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13, 
pp.24–54. (1984). 
Reichlin, Massimo, “The Argument from Potential: A reappraisal.” Bioethics 11, 
pp.1-23. (1997). 
Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation. The Bodley Head London. (2015). 
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press. (1993). 
Steinbock, Bonnie. Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos 
and Fetuses. Oxford University Press. (2011). 
Sumner, L.W. Abortion and Moral Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. (1981). 
Thomson, Judith Jarvis, “A Defense of Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
1; pp.44-66. (1971).  
Tooley, Michael, “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2; 1, 
pp.37-65. (1972). 
Warren, Mary Anne, Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection. Totowa, NJ: 
Rowman and Allenheld. (1985). 
Werner, Richard. “Abortion: The Ontological and Moral Status of the 
Unborn,” Social Theory and Practice 3: 4. Revised and reprinted in Richard A. 
Wasserstrom, ed. 1979. Today’s Moral Problems, 2nd edition. New York: 
MacMillan Publishing Company, Inc. (1974). 
Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Fontana Press/Collins. 
(1985). 
